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How Do Illicit Drugs Move across Countries?  
A Network Analysis of the Heroin Supply to Europe 
Illicit drugs are trafficked across manifold borders before ultimately reaching 
consumers. Consequently, interdiction of cross-border drug trafficking forms a 
critical component of the European Union’s initiative to reduce drug supplies. 
However, there is contradictory evidence about its effectiveness, which is due, in 
part, to a paucity of information about how drugs flow across borders. This study 
uses a network approach to analyse international drug trafficking both to and 
within Europe, drawing on several perspectives to delineate the factors that affect 
how drug shipments move across borders. The analysis explicates how drug 
trafficking is concentrated along specific routes; moreover, we demonstrate that its 
structure is not random, but, rather, driven by specific factors. In particular, 
corruption, social and geographical proximity are key factors explaining the 
configuration of heroin supply to European countries. This study also provides 
essential insights into the disruption of traffickers’ illicit activities. 
 
Introduction 
Illicit drugs, especially heroin and cocaine, travel across multiple borders before reaching 
consumer markets (Caulkins, 2015). Although, in principle, drug traffickers have a plethora of 
suitable routes through which to move illicit drugs, in actuality drug trafficking is concentrated 
along specific routes, as countries generally have a limited number of trading partners (Boivin, 
2013, 2014a; EMCDDA & EUROPOL, 2013; UNODC, 2015d). In this critical respect, the 
international trade network of illicit drugs is indeed less dense than that which pertains to legal 
commodities (Boivin, 2013, 2014a). 
The concentration of drug trafficking along a few specific routes follows well established 
trends of other forms of criminal behavior. Indeed, an extensive corpus of criminological 
literature now demonstrates how crime is not uniformly distributed and some areas have higher 
crime rates than others (Curman, Andresen, & Brantingham, 2014; Sherman, Gartin, & Buerger, 
1989; Weisburd & Amram, 2014; Weisburd, Groff, & Yang, 2012). These findings form the 
cornerstone of the so-called hot-spot policing approach (Weisburd, 2015). The underlying logic 
of this approach is that law enforcement resources should be concentrated within the areas where 
crime most commonly occurs (Sherman et al., 1998). Several studies went one step further and 
identified the characteristics of these ‘hot’ areas (Eck, Clarke, & Guerette, 2007; Smith, Frazee, 
& Davison, 2000; Weisburd et al., 2012; Wikström, 2012), establishing how socioeconomic (e.g., 
low income, ethnic heterogeneity, residential instability) and physical features (e.g., land use and 
presence of risky facilities) of places can help us account for crime concentration. Such research 
was invaluable in terms of providing an evidence-base from which to both efficiently manage 
police resources, and to design social interventions aimed at tackling the root causes of crime 
(Weisburd, Groff, & Yang, 2013). 
The disruption of illicit drug trafficking, both within the European Union (EU) and along 
its external borders, constitutes a key priority of the EU Drugs Strategy (2013-2020) (Council of 
the European Union, 2012). Yet, evidence pertaining to the effectiveness of current interdiction 
programmes is contradictory at best (Collins, 2014). For example, traffickers adapt to interdiction 
programmes by either changing their modes of transportation and hiding techniques, or shifting 
to alternative routes (Friesendorf, 2005; Manski, Pepper, & Thomas, 1999; Reuter, 2014; 
Seccombe, 1995; Windle & Farrell, 2012). The latter form of adaptation is often referred to as the 
‘balloon effect’, and suggests that stronger law enforcement actions in one location will result in 
the displacement of drug trafficking activities to another location (Friesendorf, 2005; Hawdon & 
Kleiman, 2011; Reuter, 2014). The balloon analogy derives from the similarity between this 
dynamic and that of incompressible fluids that move toward areas of lower resistance when under 
pressure (Mora, 1996). Consequently, eradications, seizures, and other drug control interventions 
taking place in one country may damage others if coordination schemes are scant (Chouvy, 2012; 
Mora, 1996; Reuter, 2014). The emergence of a supply route of cocaine to Europe via Africa 
following the instantiation of increased level of controls between the Netherlands and the 
Netherlands Antilles, is a recent example which testifies to the notorious balloon effect and the 
limits of interdiction programmes (Reuter, 2014; UNODC, 2007, 2013). 
The concentration of drug trafficking along specific routes also suggests that traffickers 
are driven by specific motives (Boivin, 2014a; Reuter, 2014; UNODC, 2015c). The understanding 
of how and why crime focuses within particular areas proved to be integral to the introduction of 
new criminal justice and social interventions aimed at reducing crime. Similarly, one would think 
that gaining insights into the concentration of drug trafficking along specific routes could also aid 
efforts to identify the most effective counter-policies, evaluate the consequences of interdiction 
programmes, and anticipate the possible displacement of traffickers’ illicit activities because of 
such programmes. However, there has hitherto been a dearth of empirical research investigating 
which factors shape the geographic configuration of international drug trafficking and why it 
concentrates along a specific and limited range of paths (Trumbore & Woo, 2014). 
The present contribution investigates the determinants of the geopolitical configuration 
of heroin supply to European countries. It draws from several disciplines (i.e., criminology, 
macroeconomics, and geography) to explain what factors determine how drug shipments move 
across countries. The reason for our focus on the trafficking of heroin to Europe is twofold. First, 
heroin consumption still accounts for a large share of drug-related health and social costs in 
Europe (EMCDDA, 2015). For example, forty experts from across the EU recently judged heroin 
to be the most harmful illicit psychoactive substance in Europe, as well as the second most 
harmful overall with respect to sixteen harm criteria (van Amsterdam, Nutt, Phillips, & van den 
Brink, 2015). The purity of the heroin available in certain European markets, and therefore its 
potential harm, is increasing alongside the number of overdose deaths (EMCDDA, 2015). Second, 
Europe has a large availability of country-level data. As concluded in the first European 
Conference on Drug Supply Indicators “[…] a considerable amount of data on drug supply is 
already being collected in a systematic way across the EU, and the way forward is to build on 
what already exists […]” (EMCDDA, 2010, p. 7). Despite this article’s focus, the methodological 
approach can be replicated and adapted to other geographic areas, illicit substances (e.g., cocaine, 
cannabis), and illicit markets (e.g., trafficking in human beings). 
The article is structured as follows. The second section reviews literature on the manifold 
factors that shape international drug trafficking, in addition to outlining the theoretical framework. 
The third section introduces the empirical methodology, before proceeding to discuss the data, 
the analytical strategy mobilised in the article, and its limitations. The fourth section presents and 
discusses the results. The article concludes by delineating the emergent research and policy 
implications. 
Theoretical perspective on international drug trafficking 
Current knowledge of the various factors underpinning the geopolitical configuration of 
transnational drug trafficking routes is limited, both theoretically and empirically – in fact, it is 
practically absent in the latter instance (von Lampe, 2012). While a range of authors, such as 
Caulkins, Crawford, and Reuter (1993), Akyeampong (2005), Decker and Townsend-Chapman 
(2008), Paoli and Reuter (2008), and Kleemans (2013) provide some valuable insights, there is 
neither a systematic knowledge-base or established framework from which to explicate the 
geographical configuration of transnational drug trafficking routes. The contribution by Reuter 
(2014), centres on three models, and marks the sole attempt to systematically organize knowledge 
about how smugglers choose drug routes. 
The first model is founded upon the idea that the costs imposed by law enforcement 
authorities, such as loss of shipments, confiscation of assets and, more importantly, incarceration, 
are the principal costs for drug traffickers (Caulkins & Reuter, 1998; Kuziemko & Levitt, 2004; 
Reuter & Kleiman, 1986). Resultantly, the more national law enforcement agencies increase these 
costs, the less attractive a country will be (Reuter, 2014).  
The second model identifies geographical proximity to the main producer or consumer 
countries as an important risk factor for becoming a transhipment country, as travelling long 
distances increases transportation costs as well as the risk of interception and arrest (Reuter, 
2014). As Reuter (2014) points out, both the proximity of Mexico to the United States and the 
Balkan countries to Western Europe is a crucial factor in their pivotal role in the trafficking of 
cocaine and heroin, respectively. 
In the third model, Reuter (2014) argues that social ties among countries, such as 
migration patterns, may shape drug trafficking routes. With regards to the drug trade in Western 
Europe for example, Paoli and Reuter (2008) found that Turkish and Albanians dominate both 
the import and retail distribution of heroin, while Colombians have a leading role in the import 
of cocaine from South America. Along with the relative proximity to production or key trafficking 
countries, a large immigrant diaspora in several European countries is a common trait of these 
ethnic groups. In a similar vein, Nigerian traffickers are now increasingly playing an important 
role in the trafficking of cocaine. Despite Nigeria’s distance from any significant producer or 
consumer country, the migration of three million Nigerians to Southeast Asia, the United States, 
Latin America, and Europe goes some way to helping us explain this emergent dynamic (Paoli & 
Reuter, 2008). Whilst easy access to suppliers and fertile ground for corruption may constitute a 
competitive advantage to be exploited in transnational drug trafficking activities, other authors 
stress the relevance of diasporas and social networks as crucial assets for transnational crimes in 
general (van Duyne, 1993; Kleemans & van De Bunt, 1999; Bruinsma & Bernasco, 2004; Soudijn 
& Kleemans, 2009) and drug trafficking specifically (Zaitch, 2002; Akyeampong, 2005). 
This study, following the aforesaid framework elaborated by Reuter (2014), develops 
three hypotheses for the purposes of understanding the geopolitical configuration of the 
international supply of heroin to Europe. The first hypothesis relates to the claim that the routes 
offering high economic returns and low risks of interception are more likely to be used to traffic 
drugs. The “risks and prices” model developed by Reuter and Kleiman (1986) postulates that 
traffickers are rational actors who seek to maximize profits and reduce risks. According to this 
perspective, countries imposing lower costs, namely a lower risk of interception and higher profits 
for traffickers, should be more likely to import and/or export heroin. Similarly, corrupt officials 
reduce the risk of interception and thus facilitate drug trafficking, although bribing custom 
officers may represent initial costs for traffickers (Desroches, 2007; Greenfield & Paoli, 2012; 
Van Dijk, 2007; Trumbore & Woo, 2014). Boivin (2014b) found that price mark-ups tend to be 
lower in destination countries with high levels of corruption. This confirms that the monetary 
costs for bribing custom officials are lower than the non-monetary costs of a higher risk of arrest 
or seizure (Reuter & Kleiman, 1986). 
The second hypothesis states that heroin flows are more likely to occur within countries 
that are geographically close to each other. As Reuter (2014) notes, geographic proximity can 
reduce the costs associated with drug trafficking. Indeed, several studies have documented the 
negative effect of geographic distance on legal trade. In a meta-analysis of 103 studies, Disdier 
and Head found that a 10% increase in distance lowers legal trade by about 9% (2008, p. 37). The 
effect of geographic distance on illegal trade is even larger. Caulkins and Bond (2012, p. 40) 
calculated that the price of marijuana in the United States increased by about USD 325 to USD 
475 per pound per 1,000 miles of distance from Mexico. Since traffickers operate under the threat 
of law enforcement authorities, longer distances involve longer exposure to risk of interception 
and arrest. 
The third hypothesis predicts that countries that are socially closer are more likely to be 
connected to each other than countries that are not. As Reuter argues (2014), besides geography, 
certain social factors, such as migration flow between two countries, may facilitate trafficking 
between them. Several studies in macroeconomics, for example, point out that social proximity 
between countries reduces the barriers for legal trade by providing opportunities for businesses 
and easier access to valuable information (Ghemawat, 2001; Prashantham, Dhanaraj, & Kumar, 
2015; Rauch, 1999; Sgrignoli, Metulini, Schiavo, & Riccaboni, 2015). Therefore, it is reasonable 
to assume that the effect of social proximity would also apply to illegal trading, inasmuch as 
participants cannot rely on legal institutions to solve their disputes. That is to say, traffickers need 
to agree on quantity, purity, conditions of the shipment, and payment. They may also need to deal 
with unexpected and hostile situations (i.e., seizure of the shipment) where the two parties need 
to find a common solution (Lameli, Nitsch, Südekum, & Wolf, 2013). Speaking the same 
language, sharing the same socio-cultural background or coming from the same institutional 
setting increase trust in the partner and reduce transaction costs (Combes, Lafourcade, & Mayer, 
2005; Kleemans & van De Bunt, 1999; Paoli & Reuter, 2008).  
Language and cultural affinity facilitate cross-border transactions by providing traders 
with the opportunity to rely on non-economic, socio-cultural factors (e.g., reputation and trust of 
suppliers, ethnic ties) to find international partners and to reduce uncertainties in trading (Lee & 
Park, 2016; Sgrignoli et al., 2015). As observed in legal trading, pre-existing ties are a determinant 
factor during the search for a trading partner, and informal networks also play a key role in 
shaping international trade (Rauch, 1999). For example, informal networks may sanction 
violations of the trafficking agreements by blacklisting the deviant partner and excluding him/her 
from future deals (Rauch & Trindade, 2002). Especially in the context of illicit industries, pre-
existing ties rather than market-driven reasons (i.e., profits or dimension of the market) may lead 
to the decision to export to specific countries. 
Data and methods 
The heroin trafficking network 
Following the work of Paoli, Greenfield, and Reuter (2009), this study conceives of international 
drug trafficking as a series of trading relations among countries. Although the authors do not use 
network analysis techniques, they employ a framework and terminology (e.g. “flow model”) in 
line with this approach. This is also consistent with other researchers who have subsequently 
utilised a social network approach to study the international trafficking of illicit drugs (Boivin, 
2013, 2014b, 2014a; Chandra & Joba, 2015). 
Data on heroin trafficking network to and within Europe derives from seizure cases 
reported in the UNODC Individual Drug Seizure (IDS) database that contains information about 
the origin, transit, and destination of shipments seized (Boivin, 2011, 2013, 2014b; UNODC, 
2015c). This information is used to identify the pairs of countries exporting and importing heroin 
with each other and, in turn, to establish the position of each country in the international heroin 
trafficking network. Table 1 reports an example of the IDS dataset structure. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The heroin trade network includes all European countries for which data are currently 
available (N=36) and all non-European countries (N=25) who import from or export to Europe, 
as according to seizure cases that occurred between 2007 and 2012 (UNODC, 2014a).1 For 
instance, a seizure of heroin destined for Italy occurring on the border between Slovenia and 
Croatia provides evidence for two connections: firstly, between Italy and Slovenia; and, secondly, 
between Croatia and Slovenia (Boivin, 2013). 
The IDS database provides 10,378 different dyads determining 325 pairs of countries.2 
In 138 of these 325 cases, the connection accounts for less than 1% of the seizures taking place 
as the goods were being imported into the country. These connections are likely to represent weak 
or sporadic links between countries and, consequently, are not included within our analysis here. 
The final network corresponds to 187 pairs of countries. 
Independent variables 
This study uses both nodal and relational attributes data in order to understand what factors make 
up the European heroin trafficking network. Nodal attributes refer to specific features of 
importing countries, such as the level of corruption, whereas relational attributes provide 
information about the links between any two given countries (e.g., number of migrants from one 
country to another). Table 2 reports the independent variables used in the analysis along with the 
source, reference period and nature of the variable (i.e., nodal or relational attribute). 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
According to our first hypothesis, traffickers are more likely to ship drugs to countries 
where there are lower risks of interception or higher profits are likely to be procured. The study 
operationalizes the concept of risk in terms of law enforcement and corruption; profits are 
operationalized in terms of price mark-ups and market size. It is important to note that measuring 
the level of enforcement across countries presents several issues. Firstly, data on drug-related 
arrests are generated by national legal systems and thus differ dramatically across countries. 
Secondly, offences can be registered at different stages (e.g., when reported to law enforcement 
agencies, after investigation), notwithstanding that countries may use different thresholds to 
discern sales from personal use and employ different counting rules (Kilmer, Reuter, & 
Giommoni, 2015). Lastly, and most importantly, there is no available data on drug-related 
offences for several of the countries included within this analysis. 
Given the limitations of trying to use proxies for the level of enforcement across 
countries, a twofold approach is adopted here. The first uses the presence of police forces (rate 
per 100,000 population) and seizure rate (quantity of heroin seized per 100,000 population) in 
each country as nodal attributes with which to proxy law enforcement capacity, arrest traffickers 
and to intercept shipments (Boivin, 2014c; Keefer, Loayza, & Soares, 2008; Soares, 2004). The 
second approach substitutes the police rate for the law and order index from the International 
Country Risk Guide (The PRS Group, Inc., 2015). This index measures both the impartiality of 
the legal system and the ability of a country to effectively enforce the law. The index ranges from 
1 (weak level of law and order) to 6 (high level of law and order). Hernandez and Rudolph (2015) 
used the law and order index as a proxy for the level of enforceability, and found that it is related 
negatively to human trafficking flows. 
The hypothesis that corruption facilitates drug exchanges between countries is tested by 
introducing into the model the level of corruption as measured by the World Bank, i.e., 
perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty 
and grand forms of corruption.3 
Profit maximisation is taken into account by including within the model the differences 
in wholesale prices between any two countries (measured in USD/kg) and the number of heroin 
users in importing countries.4 Both variables serve as a proxy for the economic-driven behaviour 
of traffickers. Whereas the former looks at higher return per unit sold, the latter tests whether 
countries with a higher demand tend to import heroin from a higher number of trading partners. 
The model also includes two matrices of spatial proximity for the purposes of testing how 
geographical distance influences illicit trafficking. The first matrix measures the distance between 
two countries, whilst taking into consideration the actual distribution of the population within the 
respective nations (Mayer & Zignago, 2011).5 The second matrix controls for countries which 
share a common border, a condition that might provide traffickers with lower risk when 
attempting to move drugs across land rather than by air or sea, which are usually subject to higher 
controls (Reuter, 2014, p. 34). 
Finally, three relational variables are used to test to what extent social proximity 
facilitates drug trafficking between any two given countries. Several studies in macroeconomics 
identify migration, common language and past colonial relationships as primary social factors 
affecting legal trade (Frankel & Rose, 2002; Ghemawat, 2001; Lameli et al., 2013; Lee & Park, 
2016; Rauch, 1999; Sgrignoli et al., 2015). Their effect is tested by considering migration flows 
among the 61 countries included within the analysis, the presence of a language spoken by at least 
9% of the population in any pair of countries, as well as historical colonial relationships among 
countries. Migration data from the United Nations Global Migration Database (UNGMD) reports 
the number (“stock”) of international migrants, for each country, in relation to their country of 
origin. Data on common language and historical colonial relationships derive from the Centre 
d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII). 
Exponential random graph models 
Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGMs) are a class of statistical models for networks that 
allow for the prediction of the probability of tie formation based on a set of covariates (nodal and 
relational attribute data) and the properties of the network itself (Robins, Pattison, Kalish, & 
Lusher, 2007). These models formulate the probability of observing a set of connections as: ܲሺܻ = �|ܺሻ = exp⁡[ሺ���ሺ�, ܺሻ]/�ሺ�ሻ 
where ܻ is the set of edges in a network, � is a particular given set of edges, ܺ represents 
a matrix of attributes for the vertices in the network, �ሺ�, ܺሻ a vector of network statistics, � 
corresponds to the vector of coefficients, and �ሺ�ሻ a normalising constant (Goodreau, Handcock, 
Hunter, Butts, & Morris, 2008). Both dyad independence models and dyad dependence models—
i.e., those controlling for higher order interdependencies between countries— are estimated 
(Robins et al., 2007). 
Most statistical models assume that all observations are conditionally independent. Yet, 
“when modelling international trade the assumption of conditional independence is difficult to 
sustain even in the presence of directed country or dyad fixed effects” (Ward, Ahlquist, & 
Rozenas, 2013, p. 96). ERGMs enable researchers to take into account interdependencies among 
observations, including higher-order dependencies, i.e., reciprocity, transitivity, balance and 
clusterability (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). To cite an example, transitivity encapsulates the logic 
that the “friend of a friend is a friend”. Henceforth, if country i trades with country j, and country 
j trades with country k, then the probability of a flow of goods between i and k is greater than that 
between i and a fourth country that has no prior or pre-existing trade relationship. 
ERGMs take into account dependencies among observations by including parameters for 
endogenous structural effects, such as reciprocity, transitivity, and the distribution of incoming 
and outgoing ties in the trafficking network. A parameter for mutual dyads (MUTUALS) captures 
the probability of reciprocal ties between any two given countries. Two terms are added to account 
for transitivity in the network: geometrically weighted dyadwise shared partners (GWDSP) and 
geometrically weighted edgewise shared partners (GWESP). They represent two-paths and 
transitive triads, respectively. Geometrically weighted in-degree (GWIDEGREE) and out-degree 
(GWODEGREE) are included in order to capture the skewed distribution of ties among countries. 
These parameters aid us in our attempt to capture processes influenced by the characteristics of 
the network, and, in turn, limit the problem of model degeneracy (Hunter, 2007; Hunter & 
Handcock, 2006). 
The study adopts an iterative development model to identify the combination of variables 
that best fit the data (Goodreau, Kitts, & Morris, 2009; Papachristos, Hureau, & Braga, 2013). 
The suitability of the models is assessed through comparing the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC), and by performing goodness-of-fit checks outlined in the work of Hunter, Goodreau and 
Handcock (2008). The analyses are performed using the Statnet suite of packages (Handcock et 
al., 2016; 2008) for R (R Core Team, 2016). 
Limits 
This study begins to construct the heroin trafficking network by utilising information from the 
UNODC IDS dataset. However, it is important to note that UN member states only submit 
information about relevant seizure cases on a voluntary basis (Boivin, 2014c). Consequently, 
some countries may not report information, resulting in a lack of particular connections in the 
network (Boivin, 2011). By using data spanning across several years (2007-2012) and by focusing 
specifically on European countries, which tend to provide more information than non-European 
ones, we hope to reduce the risk of omitting significant links. Having said this, the network can 
only ever be partial and incomplete, lacking in both minor connections and important ones. Most 
notably, the network neglects the pivotal role of Russia as a transhipment point to Central Europe, 
due to the paucity of information provided by Russia and its neighbouring countries (i.e., Belarus, 
Ukraine, and Estonia).  
Other potential biases derive from misunderstandings during the compilation of the IDS 
by UN member states. Specifically, there is an observed tendency for officers to sometimes 
indicate the last country for which they can track the shipment, which, of course, can be different 
from the last country from which the heroin actually flowed (Boivin, 2011). That said, a careful 
check of the information of each seizure case may add to the meaningfulness of the analysis, but 
it does not guarantee the reliability of the original information. 
The network under analysis also considers if two countries export/import heroin from 
each other, but it does not take into account the amount of drug which is traded, thus ignoring a 
critical element of the complexity of drug trafficking. However, this modelling of the network 
reduces the potential bias stemming from the non-uniformity of reporting on significant seizures. 
Indeed, including quantities may upwardly inflate the role of exporter for countries with a higher 
interception rate. The only way in which this bias would affect this analysis is if some countries 
tend to enforce more along certain borders than others.6 
The operationalization of the independent variables also raises several concerns. Firstly, 
the rate of police officials may not serve as an appropriate proxy for the level of enforcement 
against the supply of drugs. That is to say, police officials are employed for manifold duties 
besides enforcing the supply of illicit drugs, not to mention that higher numbers of police officials 
does not necessarily equate to better policing performance. However, we wish to note that several 
other studies have used this variable to estimate the risk of interception given the lack of better 
proxies at a cross-national level (Boivin, 2014a; Keefer et al., 2008; Soares, 2004). Similarly, 
seizure rate is not a straightforward indicator of the level of interdiction, as seizures are an 
outcome of several factors including quantity of drug supplied, interdiction and the care taken by 
traffickers (Kilmer et al., 2015; Kilmer & Hoorens, 2010; MacCoun & Reuter, 2001). 
Disentangling the effects of these complex factors is at this present moment simply not possible. 
The introduction of the law and order index, which aims to measure the capability of institutions 
to monitor illicit activities, represents one such concerted attempt to corroborate the results about 
the effect of law enforcement on international drug trafficking. However, as with the aforesaid 
variables, the law and order index does not specifically assess enforcement against the supply of 
illicit drugs, but, rather, the institution’s overall performance. 
The illegality of the heroin market makes it incredibly difficult to collect reliable data on 
the number of users and pricing (Reuter & Greenfield, 2001). Such data collection issues are 
exacerbated yet further when extended to cross-country analysis, as estimates may reflect both 
differences across countries as well as countries’ idiosyncratic data collection methods. Such 
factors introduce cross-country comparability issues and, ultimately, affect the analysis (Kilmer 
et al., 2015). With respect to the number of heroin consumers, the adoption of the total number 
of estimated users reduces the bias introduced by different estimate methods of the drugs 
prevalence. Kilmer et al. (2015) and UNODC (2015c) provide detailed discussions about the 
limits and potential biases caused by the use of such data. 
Results and discussion 
The trafficking network is composed of 61 nodes (countries) and 187 edges or links that 
correspond to 5% of all possible edges (a density equal to 0.05).7 Table 3 reports some descriptive 
statistics of the heroin trafficking network from, to, and within Europe. As in previous studies 
(Boivin, 2013, 2014a), the heroin trafficking network shows a relatively low density, i.e. 
traffickers concentrate on traversing a limited range of specific routes. On average, each country 
imports heroin from three other countries (i.e., in-degree) and has trading relations with six other 
countries in the network. 
TABLE 3 AND FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The two graphs in Figure 2 show the distribution of incoming (i.e., imports) and outgoing 
(i.e., exports) ties. In-degree and out-degree scores are not equally distributed among the nodes, 
and the network is more centralised in terms of out-degree rather than in-degree centrality; a small 
number of countries export to a plethora of other countries, whilst the majority have only one or 
a few trading partners to export to. This suggests that some countries have a hub role within 
international heroin trafficking, whereas others are only involved in it as transit countries due to 
their geographic location along major trafficking routes. Pakistan (out-degree=26), Turkey (22) 
and Bulgaria (15) are the countries with the largest number of outgoing ties. This is due to their 
relative proximity to Afghanistan, which is the largest opium producer in the world and the point 
of origin for the vast majority of illicit opiates flowing to Europe (UNODC, 2015c, 2016).  
Some researchers report the involvement of African countries in the export of heroin from 
Asia to North America (Ellis, 2009; UNODC, 2010), and more recently to Europe (UNODC, 
2015a). Large seizures have been recorded only between Nigeria and France, and between Kenya 
and Switzerland, which would suggest that African countries have not attracted substantial heroin 
trafficking in the period of 2007-2012. 
Seizure cases show only residual levels of heroin flow from American countries to 
Europe. The sole links identified in this path connect Bolivia with Ecuador and Spain. Heroin 
flows from Europe to the Americas are also scarce and targeted mainly at Canada. This confirms 
findings from previous studies that there is a degree of separation between the European and the 
American markets (Ciccarone, 2009; UNODC, 2015d). Mexico, Colombia, and Guatemala have 
jointly provided the majority of heroin targeted at the large US market, as well as other minor 
markets in the region (Ciccarone, 2009; Astorga & Shirk, 2010; UNODC, 2015d; ONDCP, 2016). 
The number of incoming ties is more homogeneous among the countries included in this 
network (in-degree centralisation=0.185). Generally, countries import heroin from either one or, 
at most, a few trade partners. However, differences among countries exist which confirm 
important asymmetries in their role within the heroin market (UNODC, 2014b). Countries at the 
end of the supply chain have much higher in-degree scores (i.e., number of incoming ties). These 
include Spain (in-degree=14), Austria (10), Germany, and Denmark (8), which both confirms 
their role as importers and the necessity of satisfying their internal demand. 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Statistics pertaining to the flow betweenness centralisation support the validity of the 
strategy used to model the international heroin network. Flow betweenness centrality accounts 
for all of the times a node is located on a path between any two other nodes (Borgatti, 2005), and 
it identifies the countries favouring opiate flows, i.e. transit countries. As reported in Table 3, 
flow betweenness centralisation is relatively low, which indicates that some countries do indeed 
have a hub position, but this role is shared by various countries rather than being centralised. 
Countries with the highest flow betweenness scores include Germany, the Netherlands and 
Turkey. Turkey is the natural geographical connection point between Western Asia and Europe. 
Most of the heroin shipments move through Turkey before splitting off into the three alternative 
branches  which constitute the Balkan route (i.e., Northern, Southern and Western branches) 
(UNODC, 2014b). Several reports have also highlighted the relevance of the Netherlands as a 
redistribution centre for the heroin arriving from the Balkan route and the cocaine from South 
America, due, in part, to its densely trafficked ports and airports (Farrell, 1998; Lahaie, Janssen, 
& Cadet-Taïrou, 2016; Savona & Riccardi, 2015; UNODC, 2014b). Germany is located in the 
middle of Europe and hosts a large Turkish migrant community that is primarily involved in the 
import of heroin to Europe from South East Europe (Paoli & Reuter, 2008). 
Table 4 reports the odds ratio for the ERGMs of the heroin trafficking network.8 Model 
1 is the baseline model and shows the probability of forming a tie that, without the introduction 
of any predictors, is equal to the network density (5%).9 
Model 2 includes the independent and control variables within the ERGMs. The results 
show that geographic proximity is a crucial factor influencing heroin trade among countries. 
Countries who share a border are 3.4 times more likely to trade heroin with each other. In contrast, 
the weighted geographic distance is not significantly associated with heroin flows among 
countries. What this suggests is that heroin shipments tend to move along land routes, as opposed 
to air or sea. This is due to the fact that, although ships and aircrafts cover longer distances and 
bypass transhipment countries, they are also subject to stricter controls. Heroin trafficking appears 
to systematically cross several countries before reaching consumer markets, increasing the time 
necessary to move the load to destination and, in turn, reducing profits, but, importantly, keeping 
the level of sophistication of the shipments low and reducing the risk of interception and arrest 
for traffickers. Further research should investigate how these results might change when land 
routes are not a feasible option, as in the case of cocaine flows to Europe, or when the value per 
volume is lower, as in the case of Chinese counterfeit cigarettes or resin cannabis from Morocco. 
The results show that both migration flows and common language have an effect on the 
way heroin moves between countries, whereas prior colonial relationships appear to not be 
significantly associated with it. As is the case with legal trade, paired countries with intense 
migration flows are also more likely to traffic heroin with each other. This confirms findings from 
previous studies on the influence of migration patterns on drug trafficking routes (Akyeampong, 
2005; Paoli & Reuter, 2008; Zaitch, 2002). For instance, Paoli and Reuter (2008) found that 
Turkish and Albanian ethnic groups dominate the import and retail distribution of heroin in 
Europe. Despite their predominance, these groups do not act as a monolithic bloc, but, rather, 
cooperate or compete with other ethnic groups to smuggle heroin into Europe. Criminal groups 
involved in transnational drug trafficking tend to organise their activities along a continuum with 
large, long-lasting and well organised groups at one extreme, and small, temporary networks of 
collaborating criminals at the other (von Lampe, 2013; Ruggiero & Khan, 2007; Kostakos & 
Antonopoulos, 2010).  
Furthermore, countries where sections of the population speak the same language are 1.9 
times more likely to traffic heroin. Egger and Lassmann (2012) showed how speaking the same 
language increases trade flows between two countries by 44%. Common language serves as a 
proxy for a form of cultural contiguity between particular countries. Several studies document 
how common or similar cultural arrangements make agreements between trading partners easier 
(Frankel & Rose, 2002; Lameli et al., 2013). For example, transaction costs are lower if partners 
share the same cultural or religious background (Combes, Lafourcade, & Mayer, 2005). This is 
as valid for drug trafficking as it is for legal trade. Above all, cultural proximity provides 
traffickers with the opportunity to rely on non-economic factors to find international partners 
(e.g., reputation and trust of suppliers, belonging to the same ethnic group). This reduces 
uncertainties in a market that operates “both without and against the state” (Paoli, 2002, p. 64), 
i.e. a market whose participants cannot resort to legal authorities to enforce their agreements, and 
are constantly under threat of arrest. 
The inclusion of migration flows and language may go some way to explaining why the 
colony-colonizer relationship does not significantly affect the heroin network. According to 
previous analyses, ethnicity and migration patterns are crucial determinants of the international 
flows of both illicit and licit goods (Paoli & Reuter, 2008; Rauch & Trindade, 2002). Language 
and migration flows can capture the effect of culture and ethnicity, and, from an econometric 
perspective, mitigate the role of past colonial relationships in the formation of trading 
connections. Lameli et al. (2013) examine various aspects of linguistic influences on trade, 
concluding that the principal effect from speaking the same language is the promotion of cultural 
proximity among partners. Migration patterns often overlap with colonial relationships. For 
instance, half of the Colombians who migrated to Europe reside in Spain. Consequently, 
migration flows may account for the movement of people from former colonies to colonizer 
countries, in turn, limiting the effect of colonial relationships in the model. 
Market forces also seem to affect, in part, the heroin trafficking network.  That is to say, 
countries with a high demand tend to import heroin from a larger number of countries, while the 
maximization of profits (operationalized in terms of trade price mark-ups) does not seem to affect 
the formation of a trafficking route. The number of heroin users is significantly and positively 
correlated with the probability of forming a tie. For example, the largest Western and Central 
European markets (i.e. UK, France, Italy and Germany), which constitute the bulk of European 
heroin consumption, import from a higher number of countries than most other countries within 
the network.10 Large markets provide more business opportunities, which, in turn, attracts more 
traffickers and drug flows from different trading partners. An alternative explanation is that 
greater availability of heroin in countries along important trafficking routes facilitate its 
distribution and consumption among the local population (Beyrer et al., 2000; UNDCP, 1998). 
The methodology utilised here does not allow us to definitively identify the direction of the 
causality, and therefore we must stress that both dynamics may coexist.  
The literature is unanimous concerning the fact that economic profits are the primary 
driving force of drug trafficking (Arlacchi & Lewis, 1990; Chi, Hayatdavoudi, Kruszona, & 
Rowe, 2013; Desroches, 2007; Kenney, 2007). However, the results of the current study indicate 
that gross profits only partially affect the structure of the heroin trafficking network. In fact, the 
influence of indicators of social proximity is stronger in this case, thus demonstrating how social 
and cultural relations are more relevant predictors of the formation of heroin trafficking routes 
than market-driven reasons (i.e., profits) (Kleemans, 2013). Nonetheless, better connections, 
faster transactions, and lower risk of detection and scams have an economic value that traffickers 
are likely to take into account when organising their businesses. 
Corruption is positively and significantly associated with the number of incoming ties; 
the higher the level of corruption, the higher the number of connections through which heroin 
enters the country. For each one-unit increase in the level of corruption in the importing country, 
the likelihood of forming a link increases by 1.1 times, when everything else is held constant. 
Corruption reduces risks and non-monetary costs, hence providing traffickers with protection 
against arrests and seizures (Basu, 2014). Consequently, it can perhaps be thought of as providing 
a similar function for the black market that the enforceability of contracts does for legal 
commerce. In the same way that strong institutions protect legal and property rights and, in turn, 
facilitate legal trade, so corrupted officials guarantee the traffickers impunity and success in 
shipping drug loads. 
Previous literature underlines that corruption can increase as a consequence of increased 
drug flows (Boyum & Kleiman, 2001; Chalk, 2011; Corso, Mercy, Simon, Finkelstein, & Miller, 
2007; Giraldo, 1999; Guizado, 2005; Moser, Lister, McIlwaine, Shrader, & Tornqvist, 1999; 
Singer, 2008; Thoumi, 2002). The use of a general corruption index, which does not focus on 
drug-related bribes, suggests that corruption has a stronger impact on connections rather than the 
other way round.  
From a drug policy perspective, the main finding of the study is that the tightness of law 
enforcement actions (police forces and seizures) in a country is ineffective in discouraging the 
formation of a trafficking connection. The robustness of the results is supported in model 3 by 
introducing the Crime and Order Index from the International Country Risk Guide (The PRS 
Group, Inc., 2015). The only difference between model 2 and 3 centres on the influence of seizure 
rates in importing countries. In model 2, seizure rate coefficients are positive and significant, i.e. 
more seizures are associated with a larger number of connections in the trafficking network. 
Countries exposed to larger flows of heroin are, in turn, expected to dedicate greater attention to 
fighting the traffic. Therefore, the positive correlation between seizure rates and the presence of 
heroin flows might be due to the historical evolution of drug trafficking and its enforcement in 
the countries within the network.  
Models 2 and 3 suggest that enforcement does not prevent the formation of drug 
trafficking flows. Reuter and Kleiman’s (1986) “risks and prices” model, used in several drug 
policy analyses, assumes that the risk of arrest and incarceration is the main cost for supplying 
illicit drugs . However, empirical studies show little evidence that additional enforcement might 
affect the supply of illicit drugs (Pollack & Reuter, 2014). 
As Paoli and colleagues point out, the international supply of opiates cannot be cut, and, 
moreover, supply-oriented policies have a limited influence (2009). Besides having a low 
probability of success, a supply-reduction approach and the imposition of criminal laws for drug-
related crimes in general may worsen the situation by fuelling corruption and violence, and 
incurring other economic, political and social costs (Calderón, Robles, Díaz-Cayeros, & 
Magaloni, 2015; Eck & Maguire, 2000; Freeman, 2006; Greenfield & Paoli, 2012; Kleiman, 
2011; Kleiman, Caulkins, Hawken, & Kilmer, 2012; MacCoun & Reuter, 2001; Miron, 1999; 
Osorio, 2015; Paoli et al., 2009; Riley, 1998; Rios, 2013). Despite these side effects, law 
enforcement actions form the cornerstone of anti-drug policies in most countries (Caulkins & 
Reuter, 2010; Collins, 2014; Mejía & Restrepo, 2014; Werb et al., 2011). This does not mean that 
a supply-side intervention should not be used, but simply that a more harm-reduction oriented 
approach, aiming at limiting its side effects, may be more impactful and have longer-term effects 
(Greenfield & Paoli, 2012). The results of this study, in particular, suggest that policies centred 
on tackling heroin trafficking in specific regions should primarily focus on neighbouring 
production countries and countries with a hub position (i.e.  those with several trading partners 
and/or those facilitating drug trade among other countries in the network). 
Finally, the model includes parameters that account for the structure of the network. The 
parameter for mutual dyads shows that there is a 5% probability of reciprocal ties between any 
two given countries, indicating that heroin shipments do not tend to move back and forth between 
countries but rather flow in one direction—from producer to consumer countries. GWIDEGREE 
and GWODEGREE capture the skewed distribution of incoming and outgoing ties among the 
countries, respectively. The latter shows that the probability of forming a new outgoing tie 
decreases as the number of a country’s already existing outgoing links increases. In contrast, 
GWDSP and GWESP account for the transitivity in the network by capturing two-paths and 
transitive triads. The former is negative and statistically significant, indicating that the probability 
of two countries exchanging heroin via a third country decreases as the number of intermediaries 
already in use increases. The latter is positive and statistically significant, indicating that the 
probability of forming a tie increases when the added edge increases the transitivity in the 
network. What these findings indicate, above all, is that the overall result of drug trafficking 
disruption interventions may vary depending on a country’s role in the network. Tightening 
controls along connections that have alternatives are unlikely to have meaningful side effects for 
third countries, whereas, targeting countries that increase the transitivity in the network may, on 
the contrary, result in the reduction of heroin flows within other markets. 
Most of the relationships investigated above could also, to some extent, be explained in 
reverse. Some of the findings shed light on the association between key variables, but they remain 
an inadequate ground for stronger causal inferences. While the characteristics of the national 
markets and of drug countermeasures influence the structure of the supply, the latter, in turn, is 
likely to modify the market and to shape countering policies. These reverse effects are going to 
be stronger whenever the phenomenon endures over time, as it does in most heroin markets. A 
country afflicted by pervasive corruption, as aforesaid, would tend to attract a higher number of 
heroin flows. However, at the same time, massive drug shipments may lead to increased levels of 
corruption. Ceteris paribus, the same logic applies to the rate of police officers. The lower the 
level of law enforcement, the higher the likelihood of drug flows to a country; yet countries 
exposed to significant flows of drugs might react with an increase in the number of police officers 
assigned to drug units, thus making the phenomenon more complex to interpret. Future studies 
should include longitudinal analyses to test how robust the results are to different specifications. 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Conclusions 
This study confirms that both drug trafficking clusters along specific routes and its structure are 
not random, but, in actual fact, driven by specific factors. Specifically, risks, profits, and 
geographic and social proximity affect the configuration of heroin supplied to European countries. 
The study proves that there is a strong overlap between the determinants of legal and 
illegal trade. Geographic and social proximity affect drug trafficking in much the same way that 
they affect licit trade flows. Geographic distance increases the risk of interception, as well as 
transportation and communication costs. Hence, two countries sharing a border are more likely 
to trade in heroin, because the imminent proximity reduces both the level of organization needed 
to ship the drug and the complexity of trafficking in general. Social proximity is also an essential 
driver of the structure of international trafficking routes. Several studies have identified drug 
trafficking as an inefficient business, due, in part, to working without the protection of any legal 
authority and the risk of arrest (Paoli, 2002; Reuter, 1985). Hence, social proximity is a valuable 
resource for finding business counterparts, procuring access to strategic information, and in terms 
of settling disputes and reducing uncertainties. 
This article offers several key insights for law-enforcement authorities and policy-
makers. Interdiction programs have accounted for a large share of drug control expenditure in 
recent years (Babor et al., 2010; EMCDDA, 2008). Indeed, even countries with lenient regulations 
for the drug market—i.e., the Netherlands—invest most of their budgets in tackling the supply of 
illicit drugs (Rigter, 2006). It is our contention that the stated priority of the EU Drugs Strategy 
(2013-2020) to disrupt the international supply of illicit drugs would be better achieved by 
employing strategies aimed at reducing corruption and consumer demand for heroin, rather than 
focusing on stricter enforcement of the supply. Increasing resilience against corruption would 
reduce the porousness of borders and prevent countries from becoming a part of main trafficking 
routes. At the same time, it would also help to decrease the costs stemming from the militarization 
of borders and the war on drugs (i.e., reduction in trade efficiency, violence and mass-
incarceration). Similarly, demand control programs trying to cut heroin consumption by reducing 
the number of users and/or the quantity of the drug which they consume—such as via opioid 
substitution therapies—may discourage the formation of drug trafficking routes. 
These recommendations do not imply that supply-side interventions should simply be 
abandoned; rather, we are proposing that the authorities should take a more problem-oriented 
approach as opposed to randomly distributing resources. Law enforcement authorities should 
focus their interdiction programs on specific connections: those identified in the network and 
those that, according to the parameters identified here (i.e., geographic proximity, common 
language and migration pattern), are more likely to become trafficking routes. As for hot-spot 
policing, drug enforcement should concentrate on the same areas where drug trafficking occurs. 
Moreover, the findings of this study can also help to develop risk assessment models, 
which aid our ability to predict the balloon effect. As the literature demonstrates, if authorities 
clamp down against specific connections, then traffickers simply displace to alternative routes. 
Interdiction in one country can have direct consequences for another; hence, policymakers who 
are planning a major crackdown should consider the potential effects of doing so on other 
countries. The parameters identified in this study can be used to predict where traffickers are more 
likely to displace to. This would help to prevent or, at the very least, reduce the balloon effect 
and, more importantly, strengthen the effect of the crackdown on illicit drug trafficking flows. 
This study represents the first empirical attempt to understand which factors explain the 
formation of drug trafficking routes. Although, as demonstrated, it already provides expedient 
insights and recommendations, further work is required in order to aid law enforcement and 
border guards working on the ground. In particular, future research should focus on the 
concentration of drug trafficking at local level and include information about the mode of 
transportation of drug shipments. This is because evidence suggests that drug trafficking also 
concentrates at a micro level (Rengert, Chakravorty, Bole, & Hendersen, 2000; Rengert, Ratcliffe, 
& Chakravorty, 2005). A geospatial network analysis, which combines information on the 
international drug trafficking network and its geographical concentration at a micro-level, could 
therefore provide critical information for law enforcement authorities. When paired with 
information about the means of transportation of drug loads, it may be crucial in terms of 
developing a problem-oriented approach to disrupt international drug trafficking. 
1
 Table A1 in the Appendix lists the 61 countries that form the heroin trafficking network under analysis. 
Countries are labeled as European according to the macro geographic regions used by the United Nations 
(UNODC, 2015b) 
2
 The 10,378 dyads often involve the same two countries. Removing the duplicates, we obtain 325 dyads. 
3
 The control of corruption index ranges from -2.5 (weak control) to +2.5 (strong control). The reciprocal 
of the index is used in the analysis so that higher values indicate higher corruption levels. 
4
 The number of users is derived from the prevalence of illicit opiate use times the population of the 
corresponding age group, usually 15-64. This data is collected from the UNODC and the EMCDDA 
(EMCDDA, 2015; UNODC, 2014b). 
5
 The distance between countries is based on CEPII weighted distance that calculates bilateral distances 
between the biggest cities of any two countries, and weights inter-city distances by the share of the city in 
the country’s overall population (Mayer & Zignago, 2011). 
6
 We considered alternative approaches to aid in the construction of the network. For instance, Chandra and 
Joba (2015) built a network on the trafficking of heroin among 17 European countries using differences in 
wholesale prices across countries. However, besides Western and Central Europe, few countries provide 
systematic data about wholesale prices. Therefore, using wholesale prices data would create problems of 
collinearity in testing the economic-driven behaviour of traffickers. 
7
 In a directed network the number of possible edges equals ܰ⁡ ∙ ሺܰ − ͳሻ, where ܰ is the number of nodes 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). In the heroin trafficking network, the number of possible trading relationships 
is equal to 6ͳ⁡ ∙ 6Ͳ = 3,66Ͳ. 
8
 Maximum pseudo-likelihood estimation (MPLE) is used for parameter estimation in dyad independence 
models. For dyad dependence models, the maximum likelihood is approximated using Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation methods. 
9
 The probability of forming a tie is equal to ܱ�/ሺͳ + ܱ�ሻ. 
10
 Russia and, albeit to a lesser extent, Ukraine also have large internal markets for illicit opiates. However, 
in these countries, a substantial number of opiate users consume compote, a liquid substance obtained from 
poppy straw. Compote is mostly domestically produced and it is less potent than heroin (Paoli, Greenfield, 
& Reuter, 2009). 
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Figures and tables 
Table 1. Example of the IDS dataset structure between 2007 and 2012 
Country Date Quantity (kg) Producing 
country 
Departure 
country 
Destination 
country 
United 
Kingdom 
4/22/2011 130 Afghanistan Pakistan United 
Kingdom 
Pakistan 10/9/2011 15 Afghanistan Pakistan Belgium 
… … … … … … 
Bulgaria 2/19/2010 86  Bulgaria Netherlands 
Spain 8/18/2010 18  Belgium Spain 
… … … … … … 
Portugal 10/1/2009 23  Netherlands Portugal 
Pakistan 1/17/2009 18 Afghanistan Pakistan Nigeria 
Pakistan 3/26/2009 8.5 Afghanistan Pakistan United 
Kingdom 
Spain 3/29/2007 7 Afghanistan Turkey Spain 
… … … … … … 
Source: UNODC 
 
Table 2. Independent variables 
Dimension Variable Source Period Type* 
Risk of 
enforcement 
Police agents, rate per 
100,000 population 
UNODC 
2009-2012 
(avg.) N Seizures, rate on 100,000 population  
Authors’ elaboration on 
UNODC data 
Control of corruption World Bank 
Law and order index International Country 
Risk Guide 2009 N 
Profits 
Wholesale price mark-ups Authors’ elaboration on 
UNODC data 
2009-2012 
(avg.) 
R 
Users UNODC 2009-2012 N 
Geographic 
distance 
Border adjacency CEPII NA R 
Weighted distance CEPII NA R 
Social distance 
Migrants UNGMD 2010 R 
Language spoken by at least 
9% of the population 
CEPII 2000-2008 R 
Colonial relationship CEPII NA R 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
*R = relational attribute data; N = nodal attribute data 
  
Table 3. Network statistics 
Measures Statistics 
Size 61 
Edge count 187 
Density 0.051 
Mean degree 6.131 
Mean in-degree 3.066 
In-degree centralization 0.185 
Out-degree centralization 0.389 
Flow betweenness centralization 0.161 
 
Figure 1. The heroin trafficking network to Europe 
 
 
Figure 2. In-degree and out-degree distribution of the heroin trafficking network 
 
Table 4. Odds ratio (OR), 95% confidence intervals (CI), and standard errors (SE) from ERGMs 
of the heroin trade network 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
OR (CI) SE OR (CI) SE OR (CI) SE 
Edge statistic 0.054 *** 0.075 0.005 *** 0.577 0.005 *** 0.602 
 
(0.046-0.062)  (0.002-0.017)  (0.002-0.018)  
Police agents   1.000  0.000    
 
  (1.000-1.001)    
Law and Order index     1.049  0.056 
 
    (0.940-1.171)  
Seizure rate   0.115 *** 0.049 0.097  1.300 
 
  (0.105-0.127)  (0.008-1.244)  
Corruption   1.113 * 0.051 1.115 * 0.052 
 
 
 (1.007-1.231)  (1.007-1.234)  
(log) Heroin users   1.096 * 0.040 1.094 * 0.041 
 
  (1.014-1.186)  (1.010-1.185)  
Trade price mark-ups   1.000  0.000 1.000  0.000 
 
  (1.000-1.000)  (1.000-1.000)  
Border adjacency   3.442 *** 0.257 3.489 *** 0.257 
 
  (2.078-5.700)  (2.108-5.776)  
(log) Weighted distance   1.003  0.030 0.998  0.029 
 
  (0.946-1.064)  (0.943-1.057)  
(log) Migrants   1.180 *** 0.023 1.172 *** 0.024 
 
  (1.128-1.234)  (1.118-1.229)  
Common language   1.908 ** 0.218 1.907 ** 0.217 
 
  (1.246-2.923)  (1.245-2.919)  
Colony   1.329  0.375 1.367  0.380 
 
  (0.637-2.771)  (0.649-2.876)  
Mutual   0.060 *** 0.726 0.062 *** 0.718 
 
  (0.014-0.249)  (0.015-0.251)  
GWODEGREE   0.280 *** 0.353 0.277 *** 0.355 
 
  (0.140-0.559)  (0.138-0.556)  
GWIDEGREE   6.242 *** 0.509 7.273 ** 0.574 
 
  (2.302-16.93)  (2.361-22.41)  
GWDSP   0.814 *** 0.033 0.815 *** 0.033 
 
  (0.763-0.868)  (0.764-0.870)  
GWESP   3.534 *** 0.145 3.548 *** 0.145 
 
  (2.659-4.697)  (2.668-4.718)  
AIC 1479 1101 1101 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05.  
 
  
Appendix 
Table A1. Countries of the heroin trade network 
Country Country code Country Country code 
Afghanistan AFG Kazakhstan KAZ 
Albania ALB Kenya KEN 
United Arab Emirates ARE Kyrgyzstan KGZ 
Australia AUS Kosovo under UNSCR 
1244 
KOS 
Austria AUT Lebanon LBN 
Belgium BEL Luxembourg LUX 
Bulgaria BGR Latvia LVA 
Bahrain BHR Macedonia (TFYR) MKD 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
BIH Malta MLT 
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) 
BOL Montenegro MNE 
Brazil BRA Mauritius MUS 
Canada CAN Nigeria NGA 
Switzerland CHE Netherlands NLD 
Czech Republic CZE Norway NOR 
Germany DEU Oman OMN 
Denmark DNK Pakistan PAK 
Dominican Republic DOM Poland POL 
Ecuador ECU Portugal PRT 
Spain ESP Qatar QAT 
Finland FIN Romania ROM 
France FRA Russian Federation RUS 
United Kingdom GBR Serbia SRB 
Greece GRC Slovakia SVK 
Croatia HRV Slovenia SVN 
Hungary HUN Sweden SWE 
India IND Thailand THA 
Ireland IRL Tajikistan TJK 
Iran (Islamic Republic 
of) 
IRN Turkey TUR 
Iceland ISL Ukraine UKR 
Italy ITA Uzbekistan UZB 
Japan JPN   
 
 
